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MANDATORY CONSENT: BINDING
UNREPRESENTED THIRD PARTIES THROUGH
CONSENT DECREES
I. INTRODUCTION
Settlement is the most common and efficient way to resolve employ-
ment discrimination suits.' One manner in which such settlements are
made is through consent decrees. A consent decree is an agreement be-
tween the parties to a lawsuit to settle on mutually acceptable terms,
which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.' Initially, settlement
by consent decree occurred primarily in the area of antitrust law.3 Re-
cently, however, the use of consent decrees has expanded into other
public law areas, particularly in the employment discrimination context.4
One cause for concern has been that public law litigation tends to affect
the rights of individuals and groups that are not parties to the litigation.
Whether consent decrees are subject to challenge by those who are
adversely affected by their provisions depends upon several factors. The
most significant factor is the nature of the rights of third parties that are
affected. Some consent decrees result in dispreferred nonminorities los-
ing promotional or seniority rights, while other decrees, or some provi-
sions of the same decree, may result in only the loss of prospective
employment opportunities.
This Comment will analyze the problems inherent in the use of con-
sent decrees and attempt to provide solutions to these problems. Part II
will discuss the nature of consent decrees. Part HI will introduce the
collateral attack bar, which precludes those adversely affected from chal-
lenging a decree after it has been approved by the court. Part IV con-
tains a discussion of Martin v. Wilks,5 in which the Supreme Court
rejected the collateral attack bar. The Martin Court held that a person
could not be deprived of rights in a proceeding to which he or she was
not a party.6 Congress's response to Martin, which legislatively over-
turned the Court's decision, is discussed in Part V. Part VI contains a
discussion of the rights of incumbent employees and how those rights
1. Susan S. Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislative Response,
1992 U. IuL. L. REv. 43, 45.
2. Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 Mxcs. L. Rnv. 321,
325 (1988).
3. Id. at 321.
4. Id.
5. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
6. Id. at 759.
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may be affected by consent decrees. The interests of future job appli-
cants that may be affected by consent decrees are analyzed in Part VII.
Part VIII examines some of the problems inherent in the use of consent
decrees and offers suggestions for resolving or reducing these problems.
In conclusion, this Comment argues that the failure to recognize the
rights of all those affected by consent decrees will not alleviate the ef-
fects of past discrimination. Rather, it will serve to perpetuate the racial
tensions that exist in the workforce, the implications of which are felt
throughout society.
II. CONSENT DECREES
There has been disagreement as to whether consent decrees are actu-
ally contracts or judgments. At times the courts have treated them as
private contracts between the parties,7 while at other times they have
been treated as judgments.8 However, the more prevalent analysis treats
a consent decree as a combination of both contract and judgment.9
Although a consent decree is generally interpreted like a contract,10 the
Supreme Court has declined to apply contract analysis when one party
7. See, e.g., United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971). "Because the
defendant has, by the decree, waived his right to litigate the issues raised, a right guaranteed
to him by the Due Process Clause, the conditions upon which he has given that waiver must be
respected, and the instrument must be construed as it is written, and not as it might have been
written had the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theories in litigation." Id. at
682. "[A] consent decree is a form of contract, and, as such, the rules of contract interpreta-
tion are applicable." South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 (7th Cir. 1985).
8. See, e.g., System Fed. No. 91, Railway Employees' Dept. v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 650-52
(1961). "We reject the argument.., that a decree entered upon consent is to be treated as a
contract and not as a judicial act." Id. at 651 (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 114-15 (1932)).
9. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,519
(1986). "[C]onsent decrees bear some of the earmarks of judgments entered after litigation.
At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement of the parties,
consent decrees also closely resemble contracts." This "dual character ... has resulted in
different treatment for different purposes." Id. See also United States v. IT Continental
Banking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37 n.10 (1975). "When the facts of a given case do not lend
themselves to easy resolution by viewing the decree as akin to a contract, courts have turned
to the quasi-judicial nature of consent decrees and have resorted to equitable considerations."
United States v. American Cyanmid Co., 719 F.2d 558, 564 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1101 (1984).
10. See, e.g., South, 759 F.2d at 613. "[I]f the intent of the parties is not unambiguously
expressed by the language of the decree, the district court may review extrinsic evidence. ... "
Id. Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551,557 (6th Cir. 1981) (beginning with the premise that consent
decrees should be construed like contracts because they have many of the attributes of con-
tracts). This is a logical approach because a consent decree is simply the embodiment of the
agreement of the parties. See Kramer, supra note 2, at 329. Thus, the contract principle of
furthering the expectations of the parties is fully applicable.
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seeks to modify a consent decree, characterizing the decree as a "judicial
act."'"
The use of consent decrees as a means of settling employment dis-
crimination suits has become increasingly common.' 2 In many cases, an
employer who is sued by a plaintiff on behalf of a large group of minori-
ties will find it less costly and less time consuming to avoid protracted
litigation by entering into a consent decree. 3 Such decrees typically
consist of commitments by the employer to implement certain affirma-
tive action practices. Because the remedies sought are generally prefer-
ential hiring or promotional policies to redress past discrimination, the
results necessarily affect the interests of nonminorities who are not rep-
resented by either of the negotiating parties.' 4
A consent decree differs from the typical agreement that marks the
early settlement of a lawsuit. In the usual settlement situation, if the
plaintiff and the defendant are able to agree on an acceptable figure to
resolve the dispute, they will enter into an agreement and the suit will be
voluntarily dismissed.' 5 Should any problems of non-compliance with
the terms of the settlement arise, the party seeking enforcement may
initiate a new action for breach of the settlement contract, which, like
any other contract, may be enforced or set aside by the court. 6
In some cases, the parties request that the court enter the settlement
as a decree.' 7 In this situation, if either party fails to fulfill its obligations
under the agreement, the other party may obtain contempt sanctions,
rather than having to file a new lawsuit for breach of the settlement con-
tract.' 8 This provides a more expedient and less expensive method of
enforcing the agreement. If the settlement is entered as a decree, the
court may provide additional assistance, such as appointing a monitor to
ensure that the terms of the decree are properly followed."1 The court
may also assist by selecting an expert to develop new testing procedures
11. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).
12. Kramer, supra note 2, at 321.
13. Id. at 321-22; Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent The Rights of Non-
consenting Third Parties, 103 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 103, 113 (1987); see also infra Part VIII.C.
14. Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the
Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CoRNELL L. Rv. 189, 200
(1992).




19. Id. at 325-26.
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if the parties to the decree are unable to agree upon an expert
themselves.2 °
Another difference between a private settlement contract and a con-
sent decree is that in the case of an affirmative action plan resulting from
a private contract, the court can only declare the contract unenforceable,
in which case it will have no effect.21 If the plan is part of a consent
decree, however, the court has the ability to modify the decree.'
Regardless of how consent decrees are characterized, problems arise
when they affect the rights of those who were not involved in their for-
mulation and thus did not consent to their terms. Although the property
rights of incumbent employees to continued employment or promotional
opportunities have been afforded some degree of protection by the
courts,23 there has been a reluctance to modify the terms of consent de-
crees that restrict the employment opportunities of nonminority job ap-
plicants, who have no such claim of entitlement to the positions they
seek.
III. COLLATERAL ATrACK DocrRriNF
The propriety of allowing those who are disfavored by a consent de-
cree to bring a suit challenging that decree remains uncertain. The col-
lateral attack doctrine prevented an individual from bringing an action
challenging a consent decree unless that challenge was raised in the de-
cree suit itself.24 This doctrine led to a line of cases in which most of the
circuit courts of appeals held that once a decree was approved by the
court, no further challenge to its terms would be permitted.25
The collateral attack doctrine is controversial because it involves the
need to balance the rights of third parties challenging consent decrees
that impair their own rights against the need for decrees to offer some
20. United Black Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1004 (6th Cir. 1992).
21. Kramer, supra note 2, at 356-57.
22. Id. at 357.
23. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
24. Grover, supra note 1, at 44.
25. See, e.g., Striff v. Mason, 849 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988) ("It is well settled that legal
actions which constitute collateral attacks on consent decrees entered in civil rights cases are
not permitted."); Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally
divided Court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988); Deveraux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power,
658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1981); Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62, 64 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d 1045, 1052
(3d Cir. 1980).
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degree of finality and certainty to the parties who use them as a means of
settlement.26 The potential for collateral attacks directly reduces the in-
centive for parties to settle discrimination claims through the use of con-
sent decrees 27
The collateral attack doctrine has been applied differently by various
courts. Some courts prohibited any lawsuit that sought to challenge ac-
tion taken pursuant to a consent decree;- others imposed such a prohi-
bition only if the party seeking to challenge the decree had the chance to
intervene in the original suit.29 While the collateral attack bar did not
completely eliminate the ability of majority employees to protect their
interests,30 it did restrict the manner in which such challenges could be
made.3'
IV. MARTIN V. WILKS
The Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wilks32 rejected the col-
lateral attack doctrine. The Martin Court refused to preclude the plain-
tiffs, who were white firefighters adversely affected by consent decrees
entered into during the settlement of prior litigation, from challenging
the decrees.33 The Court held that to do so would "contravene[] the
26. Grover, supra note 1, at 45.
27. Id.
28. E.g., Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69; Hefner v. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc., 605 F.2d 893,
898 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 955 (1980). The "consent decree was reached after
careful consideration by the parties involved; they do not wish, and should not be forced, to
defend the decree in lawsuits brought long after the decree was signed." Hefner, 605 F.2d at
898.
29. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,762-69 (1989); Marino, 806 F.2d at 1146 (suggesting that
appellants' proper course of action would have been to intervene in the lawsuit in which the
consent decree was entered); Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696 (barring any challenge where union
"had sufficient opportunity to intervene... prior to the entry of the consent decree").
30. Grover, supra note 1, at 48. The bar prohibited anyone from challenging the decree in
a separate suit. Majority employees remained free to intervene in the original suit and to raise
their objections at that time. Id.
31. Id.
32. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
33. The decrees to which the plaintiffs objected were entered into to resolve litigation
between a group of black firefighters, the City of Birmingham, and the Jefferson County Per-
sonnel Board. Id. at 758-59. The decrees were provisionally approved, and notice of the fair-
ness hearings was published in local newspapers. Id. at 759. The Birmingham Firefighters
Association (BFA) appeared at the hearings and filed objections as amicus curiae. Id. After
the hearing, but before final approval of the decrees, the BFA and two of its members moved
to intervene on the grounds that their rights would be adversely affected by the decree. Id.
The district court denied the motions as untimely, and the decrees were approved. Id. A
group of seven white firefighters then sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of the
decrees, which was denied by the district court. Id. A second group of white firefighters then
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general rule that a person cannot be deprived of his legal rights in a
proceeding to which he is not a party."' In explaining its decision, the
Court noted that "[u]nless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceed-
ing, a person not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered
therein will not affect his legal rights."35
The Court explained that Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure contemplates just this type of situation, where the outcome of an
action is likely to affect the interests of numerous people. 6 The petition-
ers in Martin proposed that rather than requiring the parties to an action
to join those who might potentially be affected by the outcome of the
case, those individuals should be required to intervene.3 7 The Court re-
jected this argument, noting that it would not eliminate the problems
associated with determining who should be included in a lawsuit, but
rather that it "merely shifts that responsibility to less able shoulders. 38
The Court concluded that employers subject to conflicting decrees would
be best able to bear the burden of determining who might be adversely
affected by the outcome of the case.39 Therefore, the Court affirmed the
decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The case was re-
manded for reconsideration of the plaintiffs' reverse discrimination
claims in light of the Court's holding that those claims were not barred
to the extent that they were inconsistent with the consent decree.' ° Mar-
tin thus provided a more accessible remedy for majority plaintiffs who
were discriminated against pursuant to the terms of consent decrees. At
sued the City and the Board, alleging that they were being denied promotions in favor of less
qualified blacks in violation of federal law. Id. at 760. The defendants moved to dismiss on
the grounds that the suit constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the consent decrees.
Id. The motion was denied by the district court, which held that while the decrees would
provide a defense to claims of discrimination for actions that were required by the decrees, it
remained to be determined whether the promotions at issue were in fact required by the
decrees. Id. After trial, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that because the plaintiffs had not been parties to the consent de-
crees their claims were not precluded. Id. at 761. The court remanded for trial of the discrimi-
nation claims, suggesting that the law governing voluntary affirmative action plans should be
applied in judging the decrees. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit's judg-
ment. Id.
34. Id. at 759.
35. Id. at 763 (quoting Chase National Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934)).
36. Id. at 767.
37. Id. at 766-67.
38. Id. at 767.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 769.
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the same time, the decision was perceived as eliminating any chance for
finality in the settlement of civil rights cases.
41
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO MARTIN V. WILKS
Congress responded to the Court's decision in Martin by enacting
section 108 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.42 The Act was an attempt to
legislatively overturn the Court's rejection of the collateral attack bar
and to restore the prohibitions against third-party attacks on consent de-
crees such as that in Martin.
As the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 199043 indicates, it
was feared that "[t]he purpose and effect of such decrees in remedying
employment discrimination will be frustrated absent such a statutory
scheme."44 The House Committee on Education and Labor believed
that Martin would result in the entry of fewer consent decrees resolving
employment discrimination claims, and that "[w]ithout remedial legisla-
tion, Congress' intent in adopting Title VII of 'encouraging voluntary
settlement of employment discrimination claims' [would] be frus-
trated."45 The goal was to strike a middle ground between the strict rule
barring collateral attacks and the approach taken by the Supreme Court
in Martin.46
There are two situations in which section 108 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 precludes challenges to affirmative action plans arising out of
employment discrimination.47 The first bars challenge to a decree by
anyone who had "actual notice... sufficient to apprise such person that
such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal
rights of such person."4 If the consent decree is likely to impact the
rights of incumbent employees, this notice will require more than publi-
cation.49 The second category denies the opportunity to challenge a de-
41. S. REP. No. 315, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1990).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (Supp. 1993).
43. The relevant provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 were similar to those enacted
as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1989); H.R.
4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1989).
44. H.R. REP. No. 644, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1990).
45. Id. at 36 (citing Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 88 n.14 (1981)).
46. Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1993).
48. Id. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(B)(i).
49. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 798-800 (1983) (holding that un-
less the individual "is not reasonably identifiable, constructive notice [by publication]" is in-
sufficient). In such a situation, involving current employees, notice could be enclosed with the
employees' paychecks or sent to their homes by letter. See Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 227-
28.
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cree to anyone "whose interests were adequately represented by another
person who had previously challenged the judgment or order on the
same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation. '50
Regardless of the motivation behind section 108, its effect has been
to reduce the availability of a forum to challenge consent decrees for
non-parties who are adversely affected by their terms. The inequities of
such a result are clear. It is the employer who has engaged in past dis-
crimination. When confronted with the claims of those who have been
harmed by this discrimination and are rightfully demanding compensa-
tion, the employer will often take the quicker and easier way out.5'
Rather than face the prospect of protracted litigation, the employer may
enter into a consent decree, which in effect puts the burden of its conces-
sions on third parties, who can be either current or future employees.
VI. THE RIGHTS OF INCUMBENT EMPLOYEES
In the case of nonminorities working for an employer at the time the
consent decree is implemented, the potential conflicts are apparent. A
consent decree that covers promotional activities will have a direct effect
on the rights of all employees who are or may become candidates for
promotion.52 Otherwise, the decree would be ineffective. 53 However,
because incumbent employees can often claim a property right in their
position and seniority status, the courts have afforded them some protec-
tion from the harsh consequences that could otherwise result from con-
sent decrees.54
For example, in Board of Regents v. Roth,5 5 the Supreme Court held
that employees have an affirmative right to continued employment,
which constitutes a property interest, when they have "a legitimate claim
of entitlement" based on "more than a unilateral expectation" of contin-
ued employment.56 In determining which terms of employment rise to
the level of a property interest, the Court looked to the terms on which
the employer had offered the job.57 The Court noted that such a prop-
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(B)(ii).
51. Kramer, supra note 2, at 325-26.
52. Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 200.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972) (holding that Roth's
property interest in employment was created and defined by the terms of his appointment).
55. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
56. Id. at 577-78. The purpose of these safeguards is "to protect those claims upon which
people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined." Id. at 577.
57. Id. at 577.
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erty interest is not created by the Constitution, but rather it is created,
and its dimensions are defined, "by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or under-
standings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle-
ment to those benefits. 58
Consent decrees inevitably result in third parties absorbing the cost
of the employer's discriminatory conduct.59 By guaranteeing racial pref-
erences in future hiring and promotional decisions, an employer may
avoid back pay liability completely, or at least minimize the amount it
has to pay.60 While this may be considered a desirable outcome, it has
also been criticized for allowing employers to shift too much of the bur-
den for redressing past discrimination onto current employees. 61 The
hiring of less qualified workers is the only manner in which an employer
might suffer in this regard. However, weighed against the alternative of
actually paying the victims of past discrimination, an agreement to im-
plement hiring or promotional quotas is an enormous bargain for the
employer.62
Although the property interest of certain incumbent employees in
continued employment and promotional opportunities has been recog-
nized,63 it has received only limited protection. When these property
rights are considered to have been obtained as the result of unlawful
discrimination, the legitimate expectations of incumbent employees may
be defeatedf a6 The analysis used in allocating burdens in redressing past
discriminatory practices invariably involves the assumption that because
whites have benefitted from past discrimination, it is not unreasonable to
58. Id.
59. See infra Part VIII.C.
60. Layeock, supra note 13, at 114. If a case if fully litigated and the employer is found to
have violated Title VII, the employer may be held liable for significant amounts of back pay.
Id. In making preferential hiring concessions to reach settlement, the employer in effect buys
its way out of potential back pay liability by giving away promotional and hiring opportunities
that should be available to all individuals.
61. Id. at 114-16.
62. Id. at 114.
63. See supra Part VI.
64. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976) (finding no basis to deny
retroactive seniority merely because it would diminish the expectations of "arguably" inno-
cent employees); MICHEL ROsENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACION AM JUSTIcE 192-94 (1991)
(discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986), that although the non-minority firefighters who were ad-
versely affected by the preferential hiring policies were not themselves guilty of any wrongdo-
ing, because they had benefitted from the effects of past discrimination, it was not unjust to
make them bear part of the burden of the remedy). For a discussion of how seniority claims of
majority incumbents may be defeated, see Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 232-34 nn.214-18.
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discriminate against them now.65 However, such an assessment is an
oversimplification.
Although society as a whole, and a specific defendant in a given case,
may owe compensation to those it has discriminated against, it does not
necessarily follow that each individual employed by the defendant is ab-
solutely liable for that defendant's discriminatory conduct.66 Nor does it
follow that because specific individuals did not engage in the discrimina-
tory conduct, they should not bear any of the burden of providing com-
pensation.67 The question is therefore one of degree. To what extent
may individuals be required to bear the burden for their employer's past
discrimination? In answering this query, it must be determined to what
extent an employer should be permitted to escape the consequences of
its own discriminatory conduct by shifting the burdens of compensation
to its current employees and future job applicants.
As noted earlier 68 an employer is often eager to settle, in order to
avoid the expense of litigation. In so doing, the employer may also suc-
ceed in shifting more of the burden to employees and future applicants
by entering into a consent decree. 69 By agreeing to affirmative action in
hiring and promotion, an employer is often able to escape its greatest
potential financial exposure-an award of backpay.70 However, such a
resolution is not justified simply to facilitate settlement if those who are
affected by the decree are not the proper cost-bearers.71
The inequity of allowing an employer to force third parties to bear
much of the cost of settlement is especially apparent where the defend-
ant is a municipality.72 When the city itself has engaged in past discrimi-
nation, making it "the culpable party, in both a moral and legal sense, for
the unlawful discrimination giving rise to the litigation," the city should
65. See, e.g., ROBERT K. FuLLiNwMER, THE REVERSE DISCRIMINATION CONTROVERSY
37 (1980); Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 233; see also Franks, 424 U.S. at 774 (holding that to
deny seniority relief to identifiable victims of race discrimination, solely because to do so
would diminish the expectations of other, arguably innocent employees, would frustrate the
"make whole" objective of Title VII). The Court went on to note that there was nothing in
Title VII or its legislative history to show that Congress intended to bar retroactive seniority
relief to victims of illegal discrimination. Franks, 424 U.S. at 774.
66. FuLLINWIDER, supra note 65, at 33-42.
67. Id.
68. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
69. Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 244-45.
70. Id. In the hiring context, no settled expectations are affected, and as long as rigid
quotas are not employed, the terms are likely to be accepted by the court. See United Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
71. Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 245.
72. Id.
[Vol. 78:153
1994] BINDING THIRD PARTIES THROUGH CONSENT DECREES 163
not be allowed to pass on the brunt of the cost of settlement to its em-
ployees.73 The unfairness of such a result is clear, as the city has a broad
tax base over which the costs of settlement may be spread.74
VII. RIGHTS OF INDIviDUALS IN TH HIRING CONTEXT
In most discussions of the appropriateness of affirmative action rem-
edies, consideration is given to the relative burdens that must be borne
by those who have previously suffered discrimination and those whose
interests will be impaired by the remedies that are implemented.75 The
interests of nonminorities that are considered generally are those involv-
ing a property interest in employment opportunities.76 Unable to offer
any such claim, applicants for initial employment are frequently left with
no basis on which to challenge a decree that might seriously affect their
rights to a position.77
The Supreme Court has given little consideration to the impact con-
sent decrees have on potential employees, stating that "[i]n cases involv-
ing valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent individuals is
diffused to a considerable extent among society generally."7 It should
not be overlooked, however, that "[t]his denial of opportunity is a very
real cost for those who lose out on account of affirmative action, consid-
ering especially that these individuals are innocent of discriminatory
conduct. '7
9
The problem faced by nonminorities in the hiring context is made all
the more difficult because at the time the consent decree was entered
into, not only were these individuals unidentifiable for purposes of join-
der, they themselves may have been unaware that they would be seeking
employment with a given employer. Therefore, they had no basis for
seeking to intervene in the original suit.
73. Id. at 246.
74. Id.
75. Laycock, supra note 13, at 113-15; J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of
Preferential Employment Discrimination Remedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479,1486-87 (1989); Robert
F. Drinan, Affirmative Action Under Attack, AmERICA, Feb. 4, 1984, reprinted in RAciAL
PREFERENCE AND RAcIAL JusIcE 117 (Russell Nieli ed., 1991).
76. See e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
77. Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 238. Professor Issacharoff's analysis suggests that
"neither the due process nor the affirmative action case law would be an obstacle to liberal,
entry-level affirmative action." Id.
78. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 (1986).
79. Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. & MNARY L. REv. 33,38
(1992).
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The court could notify those individuals with pending job applica-
tions of the lawsuit, but their status as interested applicants is likely to be
short-lived, making it unlikely that any of them could effectively repre-
sent the class of future applicants."0 If these individuals are to be bound
by the terms of the consent decree, the court must appoint a guardian ad
litem to represent their interests.8 ' Problems arise in this situation as
well, as there may be no one willing to pay a guardian ad litem, or there
may be difficulty ensuring the guardian's independence, particularly if he
or she is paid by the employer. 82
The lack of representation afforded to the interests of nonminorities
in the hiring context was illustrated in the case of Hammon v. Barry.83
The Settlement Agreement in Hammon was divided into two parts, one
relating to hiring and one relating to promotions. The portion relating to
promotions needed approval of both the minority and majority groups,
as well as the City. The portion relating to hiring, on the other hand, was
submitted for approval only to the minority plaintiffs and the defendant
City.84
When nonminority individuals apply for a position with that em-
ployer at a later date, they will be subject to the affirmative action plan
implemented through the consent decree although their interests, like
those of all future applicants, were not represented during the negotia-
tion of the decree.
One argument used to minimize the impact of consent decrees in the
hiring context is that majority applicants have no right to the jobs for
which they apply; refusing to consider them simply means they will have
80. Laycock, supra note 13, at 148-49.
81. Id. at 149. See, e.g., In re Century Brass Products, Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 275 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986) (requiring that a representative for the retired employees of
the debtor be appointed after finding as a matter of law that a conflict would exist if the union
were to represent both active and retired workers). In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043
(3d Cir. 1985) (finding in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding that because of the adverse
interests of the other parties, future asbestos claimants required their own representative to
protect their interests). The conflicts in the case of a consent decree covering preferential
hiring policies are even more apparent. Once the employer has decided to settle, its interests
are clearly adverse to those of its current employees. The employer seeks to limit its liability
for back pay, while the employees and future job applicants are interested in protecting their
rights to jobs and promotions.
82. See generally Laycock, supra note 13, at 149.
83. 752 F. Supp. 1087 (D.D.C. 1990).
84. Id. at 1090. Although the interests of the majority group of plaintiffs were not aligned
with those of future applicants, their input and approval would offer at least some minimal
level of protection for those individuals whose identity could not be known at the time of
settlement because they are not yet associated with the employer. Id.
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to take a job elsewhere. 5 The social inequities of this rationale are man-
ifest. Even adopting the view that those who benefitted by past discrimi-
nation may rightfully be required to endure discrimination themselves, it
is uncertain how many applicants actually fall within that group. The
problem with this rationale is that the burden of preferential hiring poli-
cies is felt most strongly by younger, white job-seekers who are generally
the least responsible for the discrimination sought to be redressed.86
VIII. DnicuLTms WrrH CONSENT DECREES
The primary advantage of consent decrees is that they provide an
alternative to unwieldy, expensive, and time-consuming litigation. De-
spite the benefits of expedited disposition of suits, there are certain
problems inherent in the use of consent decrees. The first is that decrees
are often approved on the basis of limited factfinding. The second prob-
lem is that in implementing a decree, the parties often act far in excess of
the terms of the decree. The third and most controversial aspect of con-
sent decrees is that they usually involve a highly inequitable allocation of
the costs of remedying past discrimination.
A. Insufficient Factfinding
One problem with the use of consent decrees is that they are not
always supported by sufficient factfinding.87 Although this is true of
most cases that settle, the implications become troublesome when a con-
sent decree affects the rights not only of those who are party to the law-
suit, but of others as well. "Generally, the remedies in employment
discrimination consent decrees are intended to eliminate present and fu-
ture discrimination in employment and sometimes to redress the imbal-
ance caused by past discrimination." 88 It is this latter objective that may
be inaccurately assessed without the benefit of traditional trial proce-
dures such as discovery, presentation of evidence, and findings of fact.89
85. See generally Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 208-09.
86. FULLINWDER, supra note 65, at 54.
87. See, e.g., United Black Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1011 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that the district court erred in entering the consent decree without proof of
past discrimination).
88. United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1505 (11th Cir. 1993).
89. The Supreme Court requires that any type of race-conscious relief be justified by a
"compelling state interest," which would be clearly established where the race-conscious em-
ployment practices remedy "past and present discrimination by a state actor." United States
v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987) (plurality opinion). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267,274 (1986) (plurality opinion). Some degree of factfinding is necessary to
establish both of these factors justifying remedial empIpyment practices.
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If consent decrees are entered early in the course of litigation when no
direct evidence of past discrimination has been produced to support the
terms of the decree, affirmative action policies are more likely to be per-
ceived as unjust and over-inclusive.
"Ascertaining the proportion of qualified applicants from each fa-
vored group would seem necessary before determining whether affirma-
tive action should continue with respect to both initial hires as well as
promotions, since the base may be skewed because of a lack of interest
by a particular favored group."9 Applying this same reasoning to the
initial implementation of a decree provides another example of a deter-
mination that should be made before any remedial measures are
undertaken.
It is well established that states violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment if they show preference to any person on
the basis of race, whatever that race may be.91 There is an exception to
this general rule, however, which arises where "discrimination against
whites is necessary to rectify previous discrimination in their favor com-
mitted by the state agency that is seeking to practice remedial discrimina-
tion." Thus, an essential element required for the implementation of
remedial measures is a finding that the particular branch of a govern-
mental defendant did in fact engage in past discriminatory practices. Far
from providing such information, some consent decrees contain explicit
statements to the contrary, with the governmental unit agreeing to im-
plement affirmative action practices while expressly stating that it is not
acknowledging having engaged in any past discrimination.93
Frequently, initial discrimination claims are brought based upon the
fact that the percentage of minorities in a given occupation does not mir-
ror the percentage of minorities in the labor force.94 However, such data
does not automatically justify remedial discrimination. Even if some re-
90. City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1507.
91. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,490-91 (1989); BUllish v. City
of Chicago, 989 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 290 (1993); United States v.
City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1261 (7th Cir. 1989).
92. Billish, 989 F.2d at 893 (emphasis added) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 509).
93. E.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 278. Through years of litigation and three separate lawsuits,
the Board continually denied the existence of prior discriminatory hiring practices. Id. Lan-
guage contained within the consent decree stated that "[b]y entering into this Consent Decree,
the defendants do not thereby admit any violations of law, rule or regulation." Hammon, 752
F. Supp. at 1114.
94. E.g., City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1499; Stuart v. Roache, 951 F.2d 446,450 (1st Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1948 (1992); Davis v. City and County of San Francisco, 890 F.2d 1438,
1446-47 (9th Cir. 1989).
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medial measures are warranted, the extent of those policies needs to be
ascertained to a reasonable degree of certainty. It is unclear to what
degree a certain racial or ethnic group should be represented in a given
occupation, and the idea that minority representation should be propor-
tional has been met with criticism from the field of social science.95
"There is no iron law of human behavior that every racial or ethnic
group will perform equally well on nonbiased examinations in all fields
of human endeavor. ' 96 Thus, disparities in representation may be attrib-
utable to factors other than discrimination, including education, geo-
graphical distribution of races, and specific areas of occupational
specialization.97
Unbiased testing procedures are one method that can be used to
eliminate much of the uncertainty as to possible causes for dispropor-
tional representation of a given class. One factor in the initiation of
many discrimination suits is the employer's use of what are alleged to be
discriminatory employment tests.98 The result is often the inclusion in
consent decrees of a requirement that new tests be developed and imple-
mented which are validated for race and gender neutrality.99
The development and use of objective criteria in hiring and promo-
tion is perhaps the most positive result of consent decrees. The develop-
ment of such tests can often be an involved process, as a thorough job
analysis must be conducted to ensure that the exam tests only for knowl-
edge and skills that are truly job-related.0 0 While the task of objectively
quantifying the abilities necessary for job performance becomes more
difficult with more complex jobs, every attempt to do so should be made
when possible. The use of new testing procedures designed to evaluate,
hire, and promote based upon merit is likely to result in far less resent-
95. Eastland, supra note 79, at 36.
96. Billish, 989 F.2d at 896 (quoting United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1261
(7th Cir. 1989)).
97. THOMAS SowELL, CrvIL RIGHTs: RHrORIC OR REArL 58-59 (1984).
98. See, e.g., Billish, 989 F.2d at 894 (including in consent decree a requirement that the
city develop new promotional tests that were to be validated as race-neutral); United Black
Firefighters Ass'n v. City of Akron, 976 F.2d 999, 1003 (6th Cir. 1992) (plaintiffs alleging that
promotional test was discriminatory because 89.3% of whites passed, while only 76.3% of
blacks passed); Davis, 890 F.2d at 1443 (basing claim of discrimination on significant disparity
between the passing rates of black and white applicants).
99. E.g., Billish, 989 F.2d at 894 (involving consent decree which mandated the compila-
tion of a new eligibility list based on a new examination which the city was to develop); United
Black Firefighters Ass'n, 976 F.2d at 1004 (involving consent decree that established a proce-
dure for choosing an expert to develop new exercises for future promotional exams).
100. BARBARA LINDEMAN SCHLEIo & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 153-54 (1983).
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ment and criticism of consent decrees and affirmative action than most
other remedial policies. Indeed, many of those opposed to affirmative
action cite the need for a merit-based system. The use of objective, job-
related criteria provides the most easily accessible step in that direction.
While the use of new exams will not redress all of the harm caused by
past discrimination, its prospective effects can be significant. Thus, this
method should be implemented to the fullest extent possible in the de-
velopment and approval of consent decrees.
B. Exceeding the Scope of the Decree
Another problem with consent decrees is that, as implemented, they
often exceed their scope and the discrimination they purport to rem-
edy.10 1 This type of overreaching undermines the legitimacy of consent
decrees. The judicial process of conducting fairness hearings prior to en-
tering consent decrees is intended to give all those interested in the sub-
ject matter of the decree the opportunity to present their views to the
court.'0 2
Subsequent disregard of the terms of the decree by the parties de-
stroys the legitimacy originally provided by having it entered by the
court. Although court approval of a consent decree does not necessarily
engender widespread acceptance of the terms of that decree, as long as
those terms are followed one can at least operate from the premise that
the employer is acting properly.
101. See, e.g., Billish, 989 F.2d at 890. The consent decree contained a provision requiring
the development and implementation of promotional examinations that were validated for
racial neutrality. Rather than waiting for the results of this exam, it appeared that the com-
missioner appointed, out of rank order, two minorities to the position of lieutenant who had
not scored above the cut-off point on the exam. Id. at 894. The court noted that such action
"would not bespeak the kind of sensitivity to the importance of avoiding racial criteria in
making employment decisions, whenever it is possible to do so, that Croson requires." Id. In
addition, the court noted that because the test scores had been adjusted to improve the results
for nonwhites by race-norming, the departures from rank order could not be justified on the
ground that the order had been based on a discriminatory test. Id. at 895. In United States v.
City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497 (11th Cir. 1993), the city and the union had entered into a consent
decree with a goal of hiring 56% minorities and women. The city subsequently enacted its
own affirmative action program, with a goal of hiring 80% minorities and women, far in excess
of the goal contained in the judicially approved consent decree. Id. at 1501.
102. A fairness hearing gives third parties and anici the opportunity to voice their com-
ments regarding the proposed decree. Kramer, supra note 2, at 358. After hearing the objec-
tions of third parties, the court may refuse to enter the decree unless the parties revise it to
address the concerns raised. Id. This of course raises the concern that the greater the changes
demanded by the court before approving the decree, the more likely it is that the parties will
forego settlement and proceed to trial. Id.
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Obviously there is no method to ensure that parties will always act
within the guidelines of a consent decree, just as there is no way to en-
sure that parties to an ordinary contract will not breach at a later date.
The courts have the authority to impose sanctions when any party to a
decree fails to live up to its terms.10 3 This same power should be ex-
panded and utilized to provide for contempt sanctions when a party ex-
ceeds the terms of a consent decree. Clearly, sanctions would be
inappropriate when remedial policies result in the hiring or promotion of
a percentage of minorities marginally higher than that contained as a
goal in the consent decree. However, in the cases where an employer
has clearly overstepped the bounds of the decree, 104 sanctions should be
imposed with the objective of deterring such misconduct in the future.
C. Inequitable Allocation of Costs of Settlement
The greater the potential backpay liability to which an employer is
exposed, the greater the likelihood that the employer will be willing to
implement preferential hiring and promotional policies in exchange for
the plaintiffs' waiver of their backpay claims."0 One commentator has
observed that "[t]he only way to shift the cost back to the employer is
through a judgment, award, or settlement that compensates losses
caused by the quota."10 6
The Supreme Court's decision in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co., Inc.'0 7 indicates that a dispreferred employee is not entitled to the
promotion that he was denied pursuant to the terms of a consent decree
because to do so "might well perpetuate and prolong the effects of the
discrimination that the [decree] was designed to eliminate."' 08 The
Franks Court did refer to the possibility of compensating employees who
are adversely affected by their employer's remedial action with dam-
ages.' 0 9 The Court also stated that courts should attempt to protect in-
nocent employees by placing the burdens of compensation on the
wrongdoing employer whenever possible." 0
The protection from liability, which acting pursuant to a consent or-
der generally provides, "does not exist where the judicial order was ne-
103. Kramer, supra note 2, at 325.
104. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
105. Issacharoff, supra note 14, at 243; Laycock, supra note 13, at 114.
106. Laycock, supra note 13, at 115.
107. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
108. McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435, 439 (D.D.C. 1976).
109. Franks, 424 U.S. at 777.
110. Id. at 776-777.
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cessitated by the wrongful conduct of the party sought to be held
liable.""' The court in McAleer v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co."' held that because it was undisputed that the plaintiff would have
been promoted but for the affirmative action plan, he was entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of the employer's liability to him."
Noting that "it may well be impossible through a monetary award for
economic losses to compensate plaintiff fully," the court nonetheless
held that "since McAleer had no responsibility for [the employer's] past
sex discrimination, it is [the employer] rather than McAleer who should
bear the principal burden of rectifying the company's previous failure to
comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 114
Hiring issues are generally beyond the scope of a union's jurisdiction.
Because neither the union nor its members would have substantially
contributed to the employer's discriminatory hiring policies, the com-
pany should more properly bear the burden of correcting that discrimi-
nation.115 While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to consider the
methods for computing the damages suffered by those dispreferred by
preferential employment policies, such an undertaking would help im-
measurably in more equitably distributing the costs of remedying past
discrimination.
IX. CONCLUSION
The problems associated with consent decrees are as complex and
divisive as the issue of affirmative action itself. The Supreme Court has
observed that it may be necessary to take race into account in order to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination,"'6 and that innocent people
may be called upon to bear part of the burden of redressing that discrim-
ination. 1 7 However, another court has also noted that "[w]hile the ineq-
uities and indignities visited by past discrimination are undeniable, the
use of race as a reparational device risks perpetuating the very race-con-
sciousness such a remedy purports to overcome. "118
111. McAleer, 416 F. Supp. at 440.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 440.
114. Id.
115. Watkins v. United Steel Workers of America, Local No. 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221,
1232 (E.D. La. 1974); rev'd, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975).
116. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986).
117. Id.
118. Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207, 212 (4th Cir.
1993).
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Because of their effectiveness in promoting settlement, it is impera-
tive that adjustments be made in the use of consent decrees to reduce
the inequities and conflicts they cause. It must be remembered, how-
ever, that "[s]ettlement is not the ultimate end of the legal process; the
ultimate end is the just disposition of parties' claims." '119 Furthermore,
"it would be an obvious distortion of the legal process to say that the
claims of some parties should be forfeited in order to make it easier for
'other parties to settle."' 2 It is therefore vital that some protection be
afforded to the rights of majority employees and job applicants without
unduly obstructing the possibilities for settlement of initial discrimina-
tion claims.
As discussed above, one possible method for achieving this goal is to
increase the development and use of objective criteria as much as possi-
ble. Objective criteria would eliminate the likelihood of discrimination
against members of any group. Another step that would increase the
effectiveness and acceptance of consent decrees is strictly holding the
parties to a decree to its terms. A consent decree should not be inter-
preted as a court-approved license to discriminate in any manner per-
ceived to be related to the objectives of the decree. Those who blatantly
exceed the scope of a consent decree should be subject to sanctions by
the court. Finally, in the interests of justice and fairness, the courts
should require employers who have actually engaged in the past unlaw-
ful discrimination to compensate the dispreferred minorities onto whom
they have shifted much of the burden of redressing their own wrongs.
The courts should therefore establish guidelines based upon criteria
such as that mentioned above. This would aid parties in developing con-
sent decrees that could both further the goal of settlement and minimize
the likelihood that the results would be any more burdensome to the
rights of third parties than is absolutely necessary.
SusAN B. DORFMAN
119. Kramer, supra note 2, at 333.
120. Id.
